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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
MANDATORY TEACHER RETIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 19671 focused much attention on the employment problems,
of the aged in America. 2 Congress indicated its awareness of the
special employment problems encountered by Americans in
the 40-65 year age group 3 by forbidding any employment prac-
tice that discriminates against this group on the basis of age.
Such discrimination has usually been in the form of reluct-
ance to hire persons over 40 years old. However, a recent
amendment to the Act suggests that the aged suffer from an
additional disadvantage-mandatory retirement policies.
Mandatory retirement constitutes common personnel practice
in both the public and private sectors and operates to force the
aged from their employment. Although the exact origin of man-
datory retirement at 65 is uncertain, the concept seems to be
an outgrowth of social legislation for the aged and a product of
managerial convenience.' In an attempt to mitigate the effect
of mandatory retirement policies, Congress adopted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1978, which
completely eliminate mandatory retirement in federal employ-
ment and raise to 70 the age at which private employers can
force employees to retire.'
During the Congressional debate over the proposed
amendments, particular attention was given to the area of
mandatory teacher retirement. The amendment, as initially
proposed, would have permitted mandatory retirement at 65
for teachers to continue.' However, the amendment as finally
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2 See generally Colamosca, "Gray Rights" Retirement Fight, DUNs Rnv., Oct.
1977, at 82; Vish, Age Discrimination Act: An Overview, 41 KY. BENCH & BAR 13 (1977);
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 924 (1975).
29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1971).
Id. § 623.
'Retiring at 65: An Arbitrary Cut-Off That Started With Three Men, DUNs REv.,
Oct. 1977 at 31.
' Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631), § 5 (amending 29 U.S.C.
§ 633(a) and 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1976)).
H.R. 5383, 95th Cong., 1st. Seass. (1977).
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adopted protects teachers from mandatory retirement until
they are 70.1 Tenured college and university professors will be
subject to mandatory retirement at age 65 until 1982, at which
time their mandatory retirement age will be a minimum of 70.1
This recent legislative action, although indicative of pub-
lic attitudes on mandatory retirement, does not reach the ques-
0 tion of whether forced retirement at any age is permissible
under the Constitution. Kentucky, along with 32 other states,
provides a maximum age (70) for teacher retirement.10 This
Comment will review the only Supreme Court decision on man-
datory retirement, two conflicting federal appellate decisions
on mandatory retirement for teachers, and Kentucky's statu-
tory scheme" in light of these cases.
I. MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF RETIREMENT V. MURGIA
The Supreme Court's only detailed treatment 2 of the con-
stitutionality of mandatory retirement occurred in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.'3 Murgia, a
state police officer, challenged a Massachusetts statute that
forced him to retire at age 50.'1 He alleged that the statute
infringed his fourteenth amendment rights under the equal
protection clause.'" The trial court'6 applied the "rational
basis" test 17 and determined that the statute was unconstitu-
8 Id. This provision goes into effect January 1, 1979. Id.
9 College and university administrators successfully lobbied for an extension of
the effective date for application of the amendment to professors. They claimed that
immediate application of the amendment to higher education would have had devas-
tating effects on personnel planning and affirmative action programs geared toward
hiring increased numbers of women and minorities. See generally 123 CONG. REC.
17,284 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
, 123 CONG. REc. 17,280 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
i See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Kentucky's
system of mandatory teacher retirement.
12 Prior to Murgia, the Court afforded summary treatment to challenges of manda-
tory retirement. See Cannon v. Guste, 423 U.S. 918 (1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S.
940 (1975), affg 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974); McIlvane v. Pa., 415 U.S. 986,
dismissing appeal from 309 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1973).
13 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
" Id.
i' Id. at 309.
"Murgia v. Mass. Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974).
" In recent years the Court has developed and applied a multilevel test to deter-
mine whether a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause. For an
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tional because unequal treatment of policemen based on age
did not have a reasonable relation to the state interest.18 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgment, holding
that the rational basis standard was the correct test of the
statute's validity, but that the district court had incorrectly
applied the test."
The Court rejected the appellee's contention that the legis-
lation should be reviewed with strict scrutiny. The Court did
not find that a fundamental right was involved and declined
to declare that the aged were a suspect class; none of the requi-
site elements existed for either classification .20 The Court found
the existence of a legitimate state purpose-protection of the
public with physically prepared uniformed police-and deter-
mined that a reasonable relationship existed between that pur-
pose and the means used to achieve it. In finding this reasona-
ble relationship, the Court relied on testimony at trial which
linked advanced age to decreased physical ability to perform
as a policeman.2 1 There were some officers whose physical capa-
bilities had not declined by age 50; however, the majority found
that the equal protection clause did not require that each offi-
cer be found physically unfit before he could be retired at age
50.22 Thus, the statute was upheld despite overinclusiveness in
the class disadvantaged by the statute.23
Justice Marshall, dissenting, warned against interpreting
the majority opinion as blanket approval for all mandatory
retirement schemes. He argued that Murgia was applicable
only when the state's purpose was related to physical fitness to
extensive discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of equal protection
cases, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1972). See also Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A
More Modest Role for Equal Protection, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 89.
" 376 F. Supp. at 756.
" 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
" Id. at 313. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)
(ancestry). In declining to declare that age constitutes a suspect method of classifica-
tion, the court reasoned that old age "marks a stage that each of us will reach if we
live out our normal span." 427 U.S. at 313.
2 Id. at 311.
" Id. at 316.
" Id. at 314.
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perform in a particular occupation and that a different result
would have been reached in the case if the classification were
based on mental ability or manual dexterity.Y
II. MURGIA'S UNCERTAIN IMPACT ON TEACHER RETIREMENT
Despite Justice Marshall's caveat, courts have relied on
Murgia to uphold mandatory retirement schemes; these opin-
ions have displayed only a superficial analysis of the relation-
ship of the statutes to the skills required by the job.25 However,
a conflict has developed regarding the application of Murgia to
mandatory teacher retirement schemes. The Seventh Circuit"6
and the Second Circuit 2 have applied the Murgia rational
basis test to similar fact patterns and have reached opposite
results. These decisions are analyzed below in an effort to de-
termine which approach to the rational basis test should be
applied to Kentucky's statutory mandatory retirement plan for
public school teachers;
A. Gault v. Garrison
In Gault v. Garrison an Illinois teacher who was forced to
retire at age 65 contended that the state's retirement scheme
violated her right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment. The district court granted the defendant school
board's motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.2s The Seventh Circuit re-
versed and remanded for trial on the merits,29 accepting Gault's
contention that the combination of an Illinois statute which
ended tenure protection at age 65 and a local school board
policy which required automatic retirement at 65 deprived her
14 Id. at 317-27. Justice Marshall's dissent in Murgia seems to be an extension of
his argument in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, in which he maintained that
the degree of judicial scrutiny used to examine legislation challenged on equal protec-
tion grounds should vary according to the importance of the state interest involved.
411 U.S. 1, 124-25 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 See Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977) (state civil servants forced
to retire at age 70); Klein v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 434 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Pa.
1977) (state university professors forced to retire at age 65).
2 Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977).
" Palmer v. Ticcione 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978).
2 569 F.2d at 993.
2, Id.
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of equal protection." Gault argued that the discrimination was
not only substantive, because of the school board's mandatory
retirement policy, 31 but also procedural, due to the removal of
tenure protection (pre-termination hearings, etc.) from teach-
ers over 65.31
The Seventh Circuit, using Murgia as authority, applied
the rational basis test to determine the validity of the retire-
ment plan. The court's examination of the state purpose in-
volved was complicated by the fact that the district court had
decided Gault on a motion to dismiss; no evidence had been
presented in the case and no affidavits filed. As a result, the
Illinois public school teachers are covered by a statewide tenure law, hIL. Rav.
STAT. ch. 122 §§ 24-1 to 24-16 (1977), which protects teachers from termination except
for cause once they have successfully completed a probationary period (two years) of
employment. During the probationary period, separate contracts are issued for each
school year, and a decision about whether or not the probationary contract will be
renewed for the succeeding year must be made by the local school board no later than
60 days before the close of the school year. Id. § 24-11. A probationary teacher is
entitled only to written notice of the specific reasons for nonrenewal, which must be
received before a date specified by the statute. Id. However, once the teacher has
successfully completed the probationary period, he or she acquires "contractual con-
tinued service" status and is afforded the protections of the tenure system. Id. A school
board which intends to dismiss a tenured teacher must not only give the teacher
written notice of specific charges, but must also provide a hearing for the teacher if
one is requested. At the hearing, the teacher is entitled to rebut any charges made by
the board. Id. § 24-12. The statute provides that contractual continued service status
"[s]hall cease at the end of the school term following the 65th birthday of any teacher,
and any subsequent employment of such a teacher shall be on an annual basis." Id. §
24-11. Although Illinois sets no uniform mandatory retirement age for teachers, local
school boards have interpreted this statutory termination of the contractual continued
service status as authority for the adoption of policies requiring teachers to retire at
the end of the school year in which they reach 65. Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d at 994.
11 The local board policy provided: "[A] teacher who reaches the age of sixty-five
before the end of a school year shall retire on that date following his 65th birthday."
569 F.2d at 994.
n Id. at 997. Tenured teachers in Illinois could be terminated only after certain
procedures such as hearings. Non-tenured teachers could be terminated without such
procedures; their contracts were simply not renewed. Gault claimed that the denial of
pretermination procedures to teachers over 65 violated procedural equal protection by
discriminating among those similarly situated. She argued that this lack of procedure
resulted in treatment unequal to that afforded tenured teachers under 65. Id. at 996-
97. This procedural equal protection appears to differ from a due process claim in that
a due process analysis focuses on the type of procedure required before the state can
deprive an individual of a property right. Procedural equal protection appears to focus
on the legitimacy of affording procedural due process to some (tenured teachers under
65), while denying it to others (tenured teachers over 65).
1978-79]
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defendant school board had not identified, at least in the re-
cord on appeal, a purpose by which its mandatory retirement
policy could be evaluated under the rational basis standard. 3
However, the court of appeals assumed that the purpose of the
system was to prevent the retention of mentally and psycholog-
ically unfit teachers. The court held that such a purpose did
not satisfy the rational basis requirement34 and further stated
that the plan could not be upheld even if its purpose were to
assure that teachers were physically, as well as mentally'and
psychologically, fit.3
The court explained that its result differed from that
reached in Murgia for several reasons. First, the court drew a
distinction between the strenuous physical nature of a police-
man's duties and the lesser physical demands made on a
teacher.36 Secondly, the court stated that, in contrast to the
decline in a police officer's physical ability which accompanies
advancing age, a teacher's knowledge and skill increase with
age and experience. 37 Finally, the court emphasized the dispar-
ity in consequences of age-related failure to perform each job,
noting that a teacher who becomes physically incapacitated
while employed could easily be replaced before posing any crit-
ical threat to himself or to his students, while a police officer
who becomes incapacitated on the job could create a life-
threatening situation.38
The court recognized that a classification may be upheld
under a rational basis standard, even if some members of the
class do not possess the characteristic sought to be eliminated
by the state: the statute in Murgia was upheld even though
some of the policemen were fit. However, the issue of overinclu-
siveness became irrelevant in light of the court's implicit find-
ing that the board's classification in Gault was wholly unre-
lated to any legitimate state purpose: "Unlike the Court in
Murgia, we cannot say that the provisions in the instant case
*3 Id. at 995-96.
u Id. at 997.
u Id. at 996.
u'Id.
" Id. This conclusion of the court resulted at least in part from the fact that no
evidence to the contrary had been presented at trial.
33 Id. at 997.
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would eliminate any more unfit teachers (assuming again that
such is the purpose) than a provision to fire all teachers whose
hair turns gray.""9
The court also found that the statute removing tenure at
age 65 denied Gault procedural equal protection rights, since
the statute discriminated among those similarly situated, i.e.,
tenured public school teachers of all ages. The court found that
such discrimination could not stand without "a justifiable and
rational state purpose."" Because the court again could find no
legitimate state purpose for denial of tenure safeguards to
teachers past 65, the scheme was invalidated and the case re-
manded for trial.'
B. Palmer v. Ticcione
In Palmer v. Ticcione2 a New York teacher who was forced
to retire at age 70 challenged the New York statute43 and local
board action4 which had forced her to retire and had denied
her a pre-termination hearing. 5 As in Gault, the appeal was
from an order of the federal district court dismissing the
teacher's complaint. However, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, holding that there had been no viola-
tion of Palmer's fourteenth amendment rights.46
The Palmer court, just as the Seventh Circuit in Gault,
recognized that Murgia required the application of a rational
basis test to the retirement plan.47 However, the court declined
to follow Gault, stating that decision "too narrowly conceives
the possible rational bases for a compulsory retirement stat-
31 Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
"Id.
42 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978).
0 "Any member who has attained age seventy may be retired at his own request
or at the request of his employer. . . if throughout the year immediately preceeding
• . . he shall have been in service as a teacher in the state." N.Y. EDUC. LAw §
510(1)(b) (McKinney 1969).
' Palmer was informed by the superintendent of the school district in which she
taught that she would be forced to retire. Later this decision was ratified by the school
board. 576 F.2d at 461.
"Id.
I d.
Id. at 462.
1978-791
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ute."45 Palmer listed several possible legitimate state objec-
tives: "to open up employment for young teachers. .. , to open
up more places for minorities, or to bring young people with
fresh ideas and techniques in contact with school children, or
to assure predictability and ease in establishing and adminis-
tering pension plans." 9 The court found that "[a] compulsory
retirement system [would be] rationally related to any or all
of these objectives."50 The court also denied Palmer's proce-
dural due process claim that the retirement statute created an
irrebuttable presumption by regarding people over 70 unfit to
be teachers." This claim was denied because both the equal
protection and procedural due process claims arose from the
same system of classification and the court felt that since the
statute had been upheld on equal protection grounds, "it
should not fall because it might also be labeled a presump-
tion.""2 In addition, the court interpreted several cases to be
binding precedent in which mandatory retirement systems had
been approved for occupations which involved primarily men-
tal skills.53
The court also denied Palmer's claim to a pre-termination
hearing; no equal protection violation existed so long as the
mandatory retirement scheme was an across-the-board sys-
tem. Also, procedural due process did not require a hearing
since "the benefits of holding such a hearing are outweighed by
4 Id.
4 Id.
'Id.
' See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
52 576 F.2d at 463.
Id. at 462. See Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977) (involving
retirement of civil servants at 70); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975) (mandatory retirement of state judge at age 70); Weisbrod
v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), affl'd, 420 U.S. 940 (1975) (mandatory retire-
ment of civil servants at age 70).
" Id. at 464. Although Palmer categorized her lack of a hearing as a violation of
due process, her claim appears to be identical to the procedural equal protection
argument sustained by the court in Gault. See note 32 supra. Although the Palmer
court also categorizes the claim as one involving due process, an equal protection
analysis is used to deny the claim, i.e., that if the goal of the retirement scheme is
legitimate and the discrimination based on age is rationally related to the goal, the
scheme will be upheld so long as all members of the class (teachers over 70) are treated
alike.
[Vol. 67
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the burdens imposed upon the state by requiring a hearing in
every case."55
The court concluded its opinion by stating that the issue
of mandatory retirement was better left to Congressional ac-
tion, as it presents "precisely the type of clash of competing
social goals that is best resolved by the legislative process."'56
The court relied on Congress' "superior ability" to collect data
aid to resolve competing social goals, and cited the 1978
amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act"7
as support for its deference to the legislative branch."
1II. FORcED RETIREMENT OF KENTUCKY TEACHERS
Kentucky's scheme of mandatory teacher retirement is
similar to those challenged in Gault and Palmer. Tenure 9 is
terminated by statute at the end of the school year in which
the teacher reaches 65,10 and all teachers covered by the statute
must retire at: age 70.61 Since the teacher's status reverts from
tenured to probationary at age 65, some local school boards
NId.
Id. at 465.
R Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631), § 5 (amending 29 U.S.C.
§ 633(a) and 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1976)).
u 576 F.2d at 465.
3, Under Kentucky's statewide tenure law, KY. REv. STAT. §§ 161.720-.990 (Supp.
1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS], a teacher remains in a probationary status for four
school years. Upon successful completion of the fourth year, the teacher is eligible for
"continuing service contract" status, which continues until the close of the school year
in which the teacher reaches age 65. A teacher employed under a continuing service
contract can only be dismissed for cause, i.e., immorality, insubordination, or mental
or physical disability. Id. § 161.790(1). A school board seeking to remove a tenured
teacher must give the teacher written notice of the charges, and an opportunity to
answer charges at a hearing. Id. § 161.790(3). The teacher may appeal an adverse
decision from the hearing to the state district court. Id. § 161.790(6).
Statutory requirements for removal of a teacher on probationary status are less
stringent. The school board need only inform the teacher of its decision not to rehire
by the date specified in the statute. The board need not show cause for the nonrenewal
but must provide a written statement of the reason(s) for the decision if the teacher
so requests. Id. § 161.750(1). Compare the Illinois scheme of tenure and mandatory
retirement discussed at note 30 supra.
" KRS § 161.720(4) (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 161.600(2) (Supp. 1978). The statute does not cover teachers in private
schools or at state universities. The Board of Trustees is empowered to set retirement
age at the University of Kentucky, KRS § 164.220(3) (Supp. 1978), and retirement age
is set by the Board of Regents of the other state universities, KRS § 164.360 (Supp.
1978).
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have adopted policies of not renewing the contract of teachers
who have reached age 65, thus lowering the actual age of man-
datory retirement from 70 to 65.62
One such local policy was challenged in Belcher v. Gish,3
in which the forced retirement of three teachers over 65 was
approved by the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The teachers in
Belcher made three claims: that the local board regulation vio-
lated KRS § 161.6004 by lowering the retirement age from 70
to 65, that this age discrimination was "arbitrary and capri-
cious and bears no relation to the purpose of education," and
that the regulation violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 5 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
a circuit court decision which had granted summary judgment
to the defendant school board."6
The Court acknowledged that the teachers' claims may
have implicated constitutional considerations, 7 but the major-
ity opinion failed to confront the constitutional issues. Instead,
the Court approved the school board's action as a proper exer-
cise of legislatively delegated authority."8 Once tenure is re-
voked by statute at 65, the Court found, the board's action
regarding continued employment of a teacher is purely a mat-
ter of contract. At 65, "[tlhe cloak of tenure falls from his
shoulders, and his reemployment on a yearly basis is depen-
dent on the grace of the board of education."6 Since the Court
further found that the school board had complied with statu-
tory requirements for notice of nonrenewal of probationary
teachers, it decided that the teachers had been retired in a
manner permissible under existing Kentucky law. 0
Presumably the Court found it unnecessary to deal with
,z The policy of automatic termination at age 65 adopted by the Central City
Board of Education is an example. This policy is explained in detail in Belcher v. Gish,
555 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Ky. 1977), discussed at notes 63-71 infra and accompanying text.
' 555 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1977).
" The teachers claimed that the state statute requiring mandatory retirement at
age 70 precludes a school district from lowering that age. Id. at 265.
15 Id. at 267.
" Id. at 265-66.
"5 "They (the teachers) assert that it (local board policy) violates the Kentucky
Constitution as well as the United States Constitution." Id. at 266.
"Id. (citing KRS § 160.290).
" Id.
Id.
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the constitutionality of the retirement system in order to decide
the case; an examination of the superficial discussion of the
constitutional issues in the majority opinion leaves considera-
ble doubt about the scope and rationale of the Court's decision.
The majority opinion makes no clear statement as to whether
the Kentucky retirement scheme denies the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of teachers." The Court simply found that the
bbard policy did not conflict with state law; the Court did not
specifically consider the underlying question of whether the
board's policy when coupled with state law operates to deprive
teachers over 65 of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
of Kentucky should face the constitutional implications of
mandatory retirement schemes when the issue is next pre-
sented to the Court.
To determine whether Kentucky's system of mandatory
retirement violates the equal protection clause, the rational
basis test must be used to examine the classification made by
the statute. The outcome of this analysis hinges on which inter-
pretation of Murgia is applied by the Court: Palmer or Gault.
The Palmer court reached a result different from that in
Gault for two reasons: Gault had too narrowly construed the
possible legitimate state objectives to be furthered by manda-
tory retirement; and the Palmer court was bound by precedents
which had upheld mandatory retirements for occupations em-
phasizing mental skills.72
Since both Palmer and Gault were decided at the district
court level on motions to dismiss, neither record on appeal
contained any evidence of the state objective. In Gault, the
court assumed that the purpose of the plan was to eliminate
unfit teachers. In Palmer, the court assumed that the objec-
tives were predictability and the use of a younger teaching force
with more members of minority groups. The major distinction
between these two cases is based on these different viewpoints
toward statutory purpose. The Gault objective focuses atten-
tion on the connection between the objectives and the group
among which the distinction is to be made. The Gault court
" The outcome in Belcher obviously indicates that the Court found no interfer-
ence with constitutional rights, since the opinion makes clear that at least some consti-
tutional issues were raised by the teachers. Id.
7 Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1978).
1978-79]
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assumed that any state objective must relate to the group
among which it seeks to discriminate. The court found no evi-
dence to support the state's contention that older teachers are
less able to teach than younger teachers. Thus even though the
state's goal was legitimate, the means employed by the state
were not reasonably related to achieving that goal.
The broad objectives articulated in Palmer did not lend
themselves to such a focus. Rather, they focused attention on
the ultimate effect of discrimination. The Gault court's empha-
sis on the group discriminated against indicates more attention
to the means by which a statute achieves its ends than does the
Palmer attitude toward legislative ends. By focusing on effect,
Palmer wrongly applied Murgia, since the Murgia Court looked
first to the basis of the classification (means), not to the state
objectives (ends) involved. By choosing such broad purposes,
the Palmer court incorrectly shifted attention away from the
connection between the statute and the group discriminated
against. In Palmer, the court upheld an age-based classifica-
tion without showing that the advanced age had a rational
relationship to inability to perform the job in question. This is
a far cry from Murgia, in which the Supreme Court considered
medical and psychological evidence before concluding that
there was a relationship between increased age and declining
physical fitness which justified the state's discrimination be-
tween younger officers and those above the age of 50.13 Gault
confronted this threshold issue of the relationship between ad-
vancing age and ability to perform the job.
In addition, the Palmer court found itself bound to ap-
prove mandatory retirement for teachers by a line of cases
which had approved forced retirement in occupations which
demand primarily mental (as opposed to physical) skills. 74 The
threshold issue of whether advancing age could affect job per-
formance was not raised or considered in any of the cases. One
of the cases, Weisbrod v. Lynn,75 had been affirmed without
opinion by the Surpreme Court two years before Murgia.
7
1
n Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976).
7, Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d at 462.
420 U.S. 940 (1975).
" The Murgia court referred to its earlier cursory treatment of mandatory retire-
ment, but stated that such treatment did not preclude a fuller re-examination of the
issue. 427 U.S. 308 n.1.
[Vol. 67
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Palmer's superficial analysis of the problem, patterned after
pre-Murgia cases, does not compare favorably with Gault's full
examination of the rationality of age-based classifications.
Despite reaching a result inconsistent with Murgia, the Gault
analysis is the one best applied in court challenges to. manda-
tory teacher retirement systems, since Gault more accurately
reflects the Murgia approach by carefully examining both the
state's objective and the means employed to achieve that
objective.
In applying the Gault analysis to a constitutional attack
on teacher retirement, a Kentucky court must examine care-
fully the state's purpose to determine whether it is legitimate.
It is difficult to enumerate all possible purposes that the state
might claim to be furthered by its scheme, but some general
observations are possible. Clearly a purpose of eliminating
unfit teachers would be legitimate; such a purpose is similar to
the one upheld by the Supreme Court in Murgia. A goal of
maintaining a youthful teaching staff would be illegitimate, as
it expresses an irrational preference for youth over age and
ignores any special characteristics that might make older
teachers more valuable than young ones. Other goals, such as
promoting administrative convenience and predictability, may
seem legitimate, but must be evaluated in terms of the manner
in which the state seeks to achieve them.
If the state's purpose is found to be legitimate, the court
must continue its analysis and determine whether the discrimi-
nation made is rationally related to the purpose. If the goal is
to eliminate unfit teachers, the court must ask itself whether
forced retirement at a fixed age will eliminate unfit teachers.
The evidence must be weighed to determine whether there is a
significant relationship between advancing age and fitness to
teach. Obviously such a decision should be made only after a
thorough presentation of medical and psychological evidence,
and the court should consider the value derived from older
teachers' experience and maturity. It would seem that the
value derived from such experience would prevent a finding
that all or even a majority of older teachers are unfit to teach.
If the purpose before the court is administrative conveni-
ence and predictability, the court must change its focus. The
court is no longer focusing directly on the class being discrimi-
1978-79]
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nated against, but is balancing the class's interest in continued
employment (and the difficulties of unemployment) against
the state's interest in an organized, predictable personnel sys-
tem. The court should question whether the mandatory retire-
ment system actually does promote predictability and conveni-
ence. Arguably, the uncertainty attendant to voluntary retire-
ment would be no greater than that inherent in the resignations
of younger teachers.
Even if mandatory retirement promotes administrative
convenience and predictability, it is possible that the state
could achieve its goal through less onerous means. Voluntary
retirement or fitness hearings may be as predictable, in the
long run, as a mandatory retirement system. If no other means
are available the statute could still fall unless the convenience
achieved justifies the abridgment of older teachers' constitu-
tional rights.
A more difficult question is presented when the state's
purpose is to create opportunities for minorities. Obviously,
this is a legitimate goal, and forcing older teachers to retire will
create vacancies that can be filled by minorities. However, the
court should weigh the competing social policies before it. Al-
though the state's goal is laudable, its effects on the aged can
be extreme. Older persons who are forced to retire may find it
difficult or impossible to obtain other employment. Also, stu-
dents are deprived of the experience and maturity of older
teachers. The benefits of an increased number of minority
teachers may not outweigh the contributions of the older
teacher, especially considering the harsh effects of mandatory
retirement on the older teachers. Since mandatory retirement
schemes have been in existence for some time, an additional
factor to consider is whether these schemes have actually been
used to facilitate minority hiring. The importance of the con-
flicting interests involved requires an in-depth consideration of
all of these relevant factors.
CONCLUSION
The issue of mandatory retirement is one which will not
disappear with the implementation of the 1978 amendments to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Although the
exact number of Americans who would prefer to work beyond
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age 70 is impossible to determine, recent court challenges to
forced retirement and the total elimination of mandatory re-
tirement in the federal sector indicate that automatic retire-
ment is no longer appealing to many Americans.
Because' the Belcher Court declined to deal specifically
with the constitutional issues presented by Kentucky's manda-
tory teacher retirement scheme, it is likely that these claims
will be presented to the court in a more direct fashion in future
cases. If and when Kentucky's appellate courts are faced with
such a challenge, they should apply an analysis similar to that
employed by the Seventh Circuit in Gault v. Garrison. The
mandatory retirement system should be examined to deter-
mine whether it is rationally related to the interest the state
seeks to further. To apply this rational basis test properly, the
court must determine the existence and significance of any
relationship between advancing age and job performance. Such
an examination of the mandatory retirement system would give
proper consideration to the standards promulgated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Murgia and would assure teachers that their
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws has been
properly protected in the making of the legislative decision.
Paula Shives Hoskins
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